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Competition for and in the passenger rail market: Comparing open access versus 
franchised train operators' costs and reliability in Britain. 
 
Alexander D. Stead1, Phill Wheat, Andrew S.J. Smith, and Manuel Ojeda-Cabral 
 
Abstract  
 
The liberalisation of passenger rail markets across Europe in recent years has focussed not only on 
competition for the market, but increasingly on competition in the market in the form o  entry by open 
access operators. The possible benefits of such competition in terms of innovation and demand growth 
must, however, be balanced against concerns regarding possible revenue abstraction and the costs of 
operating at a small scale. This paper focusses on the latter aspect, comparing the unit costs of open 
access and franchised operators in Great Britain, and exploring the variation in erms of input price 
differences and aspects of service provision including train length and service reliability. This paper 
updates the analysis of Wheat et al. [Transp. Res. A, 113, pp. 114-124, (2018)] incorporating more 
recent data on open access and franchised intercity operators in Great Britain. In addition, we include 
new comparisons of punctuality and reliability metrics, and of passenger satisfaction survey results. We 
find that the unit costs and input prices of both groups are broadly comparable whilst open access 
operators perform significantly worse in terms of punctuality and cancellations – despite significantly 
higher passenger satisfaction scores – suggesting that open access operators offer low-cost, low-quality 
services. 
Institute for Transport Studies, University of Leeds, Leeds, LS2 9LJ, UK 
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1. Introduction 
Recent years have seen growth in the number of open access train operators entering the passeng r r il 
market across Europe. These operators obtain access rights from the infrastructure manager and offer 
services to passengers alongside the incumbent operators. This has primarily been in the intercity 
market and there is now a significant presence of open access operators in Italy, Austria, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Britain. There is significant future expansion envisaged for open access 
operation under the European Union’s fourth railway package (European Commission, 2013). As such, 
analysis of the costs and benefits of open access is timely and this paper is focused on the cost side of 
the evidence base. 
In Britain, the rationale for this growth is that on-rail competition betwe n franchised and open access 
operators (OAOs) is expected to yield benefits including increased growth in passenger numbers (Office 
of Rail and Road, 2001), efficiency gains and customer service innovations (Competition and Markets 
Authority, 2016). At the same time, there are concerns around OAOs simply cherry-picking the most 
profitable services, and related to this, around ‘revenue abstraction’ – i.e. the reduction in incumbents’ 
(in the British case franchised operator’s) revenues as a result of competition from OAOs. This is 
important as there are subsequent impacts on the industry in terms of its ability to recover the fixed 
costs of infrastructure provision and cross-subsidies as well as social desirable, but commercially 
unviable, services. Currently, the Office of Rail and Road (ORR), the British ail regulator, applies a 
rule that new OAOs must be ‘not primarily abstractive’ – they must be able to generate their own 
revenue, rather than rely primarily on abstracting revenue from franchised incumbents. The European 
Commission, as part of the Fourth Railway Package, has proposed an ‘economic equilibrium test’ for 
OAOs along similar lines. 
Another important consideration is how OAOs costs compare to that of incumbents. Thus in Britain, 
are OAOs’ unit costs less than, the same as, or greater than those of franchised operators, the incumbent 
operators? Furthermore, is there an obvious reason as to why this is over and above the a priori 
expectation from micro economics that infrastructure industries exhibit economies f scale and so 
OAOs should be at a disadvantage as they are small? These questions are the focus of the presen  paper. 
The British case is well suited to exploring this problem. This is becaus , unlike other countries that 
just have data on the incumbent operator at the national level, in Britain the franchising system permits 
much more disaggregation of cost data by service type and geography. Thus Britain has uniquely
comparable geography and service type data between the incumbent (franchised operator) and the open 
access operator. As such the British data is the key contribution of this paper as its structure presents a 
natural comparison. 
This topic was previously explored by Wheat et al. (2018), who compared the costs of OAOs and 
franchised intercity operators (FIOs), and explained some of the differences in terms of scale and 
 
density of operation (OAOs in GB being much smaller and running at much lower density than FIOs), 
differences in input prices and an OAO ‘business model’ effect. Their analysis was limited to only 
having 3 OAOs and 3 FIOs observed between 2008 and 2012. We update this analysis by incorporati g 
recent years’ data on both OAOs and FIOs. This update is also important because of concerns that the 
analysis was overly reliant on a few years of data which may not have necessarily reflected a sustainable 
cost position for the OAOs. In addition to updating the comparison of unit costs and factor pri es, 
further, we also compare service quality metrics and passenger satisfaction survey scores, giving a wider 
perspective on the comparison between OAOs and FIOs. 
This layout of this paper is as follows: in Section 2 we review previous l terature on train operating 
company (TOC) costs and on the impacts and costs of OAOs. We also provide the context the 
experience of Open Access in Britain. Section 3 outlines the data used in our analysis and explains the 
statistical tests employed. Section 4 presents and discusses our findings on the costs of OAO relative 
to franchisees, explains the difference in terms of differences in input prices, and addition lly provides 
service quality metrics comparisons and comparisons of passenger satisfaction survey re lts for OAOs 
and FIOs. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature on open access operators 
Given the relatively limited penetration of OAOs in passenger rail across Europe, the volume of 
evidence and literature on open access operation remains small. A number of early studies discussed 
the various possibilities for open access operation and its likely impacts on the wider indust y. Brewer 
(1996) discussed the contestability of the rail freight market in the UK and concluded that some barriers 
to contestability existed and the impact of competition on the market could be small. The author 
surveyed rail freight users and other stakeholders, and found that most believed open access entry would 
occur, but that it would be difficult, and that many significant barriers to entry xisted. In the passenger 
market, Preston et al. (1999) argued that some open access competition was feasible and that entry 
based on cream-skimming and reductions in fares could be profitable, although in most cases entry is 
not welfare enhancing because the reduction in producer surplus more than offsets benefits to users. In 
other cases, the authors argue entry is not feasible and would reduce passenger load factors and increase 
per-passenger costs. 
Analysing the response of the incumbent operator following the opening of a new high-speed service 
from Milano to Ancona, Beria et al. (2016) found that the incumbent significantly reduced economy 
fares, but that the incumbent did not respond to price changes by the entrant, concluding that the entrant 
was a price taker in the short run. Analysing the effect of open access competiti n b tween two Italian 
high speed rail operators, Bergantino et al. (2015) found that the companies competed on pricing and 
frequency and that capacity was a strategic variable. 
 
Tomeš et al. (2014; 2016) find some benefits from open access competition on the route between Prague 
and Ostrava in terms of significant price competition and improvements in serv ce quality but also finds 
that both the OAO and the incumbent were both unprofitable and that passenger load fact rs reduced 
significantly after the entrant was able to win just over half of the market share from the incumbent. 
Tomeš and Jandová (2018) analyse the impacts of open access competition on the Prague-Ostrava, 
Vienna-Salzburg, and Žilina–Košice lines in recent years. The authors find evidence of aggressive price 
competition and significantly increased service frequencies, leading to increases in usage but also to an 
increase in overall costs and financial strain on both incumbents and entrants. Perennes (2017) discusses 
the experience across Europe of open access competition, describing common strategies for entrants, 
finding that large-scale entry is uncommon, with most OAOs favouring low-risk strategies. Most 
entrants are also described as offering ‘low cost, low quality’ services, often making use of refurbished, 
rather than new, rolling stock. Despite this, the author finds that service disruptions and bankruptcies 
are common. 
In the context of freight, Zunder et al. (2013) concluded that open access freight rail was feasible even 
in spite of considerable barriers to entry, and Drew (2009) argued that vertical separation of track and 
train and open access, as in Great Britain, had been more effective in promoting freight competition and 
benefiting users than open access alone, as in Germany but that the separation of track and tr in could 
increase costs significantly. 
Casullo (2016), using data on passenger railways, compares unit costs in markets affected by the entry 
of OAOs (Austria, the Czech Republic, and Italy) to similar markets without the entry of OAOs, and 
finds that the entry of OAOs increased costs. The author states that this may be explained by the loss of 
economies of density, higher coordination costs, and the duplication of large upfront investment costs. 
Another econometric analysis of OA’s costs to date is that of Wheat et al. (2018), who combine a 
comparison of the raw data on unit costs and input prices with out-of-sample prediction using the Wheat 
and Smith (2015) model. The authors used data covering 2007-08 to 2011-12 on three OAO operators 
in Great Britain and three much larger franchised operators on similar intercity routes. Despite 
expectations, it was found that OAO operators’ unit costs were comparable to those of their franchised 
counterparts (despite their operating at very small scale and low density), which the authors explained 
in terms of lower input prices an ‘open access business model effect’, which was estimated via an 
auxiliary regression of the predicted residuals on an open access dummy. 
Vigren (2017) analyses fare data before and after the entry of MTR, an OAO, onto the Stockholm-
Gothenburg line in Sweden in March 2015. The author finds the fares of the incumbent SJ decreased 
by an average of 12.6% between March 2015 and June 2016, and that the prices offered by MTR were 
significantly lower than the available prices before they entered the market. The largest fare decreases 
were found for tickets booked thirteen days in advance. 
 
Król et al. (2018) discuss the case of Interregio, a regional government owned OA in Poland, and its 
competition with the central government owned incumbent between 2009 and 2015. Interregio was 
unusual for the scope of its entry, serving 62% of all possible connections between Poland’s largest 
cities, and achieving a 33% market share. In contrast to other studies, the authors find no evidence of 
responsive fare cutting by the incumbent, and that the incumbent instead responded by a combin tion 
of special offers on routes affected by competition and differentiating itself as ‘high quality’ against the 
‘low cost’ service offered by Interregio, which is described as using ‘antiquated’ rolling stock and 
offering significantly slower services. The authors describe the incumbent as making use of political 
actions to harm Interregio, and state that the actions of the incumbent, and the departure of In e regio 
from a low-cost, low-fare strategy were responsible for its decline. 
To summarise, the literature seems to indicate that open access competition can lead to real benefits in
terms of lower prices, competition on other dimensions such as service frequncy and growth in overall 
usage. On the other hand, it may lead to increased costs, reduced passenger load factors and financil 
difficulties for both the entrant and the incumbent or public pursue. There is also some evidence to 
suggest relatively low quality, e.g. in terms of rolling stock used, although th s not always the case (e.g. 
Czech Republic). 
2.1. Experience of Open Access in Britain 
Open Access in Britain has primarily been on one intercity route, the East Co mainline, although 
there was some initial entry, by Wrexham and Shropshire, on the West Coast route but that was 
withdrawn by the end of the 2011 financial year. As of 2019, OAO provide 16 return weekday services 
out of London on the East Coast mainline through two operators, First Hull Trains (services to Hull and 
Beverley) and Grand Central (services to Bradford and Sunderland). This represents approxim tely 5% 
of intercity train km on the East Coast mainline, the remainder being provided by the franchised 
operator. As such, OAOs are relatively small scale in Britain. 
The study of Wheat et al. (2018) only examined open access cost trend to the financial year ending 31st 
March 2012. This represents a relatively short time period for considering OAO performance, but also 
it corresponded to the period where Grand Central was not owned by a larger operating group (before 
it was taken over by Arriva DB in November 2011). One of the key motivations of this study is to see 
whether the increase in maturity of the open access sector from 2012 in Brita has yielded a different 
cost story relative to that found in the Wheat et al. (2018) study.  
3. Data Sources and outline of statistical tests 
We utilise data on costs, outputs, and service quality from OAOs and FIOs in Great Britain. As in Wheat 
et al. (2018), we limit our comparisons to franchised TOCs running comparable intercity services only 
and exclude data on regional TOCs and TOCs which primarily operate commuting services into 
 
London. OAOs included in our samples are: Grand Central, Hull Trains, and Wrexham and Shropshire 
(to 20111 only); FIOs included are the Cross Country, East Cost, and West Coast FIOs2. The sources of 
data are shown in Table 1. 
3.1. Outputs and Quality 
Comparable data on outputs such as train km and passenger km are available from reports published 
regularly by the Office of Rail and Road, along with measures of service quality such as the Public 
Performance Measure (PPM) and the percentage of trains that are cancelled or significantly late (CaSL). 
Unfortunately, unlike in Wheat et al. (2018), we do not have recent data on measures such as train hours 
or vehicle hours, so that we are unable to construct measures of average speed. This precludes out-of-
sample prediction of costs using the Wheat and Smith (2015) model, as was done in the Wheat et al. 
(2018) study. On the other hand, we do now have a considerably longer panel of data on the OAOs and 
FIOs, covering the eleven years from 2008 to 2018. Additionally, we now have data on passe ger km 
for OAOs for 2011 onwards, meaning that some comparison of per passenger km costs can now be 
made. 
3.2. Costs and Input Prices 
For our cost variable, we utilise data on operating costs from the TOCs’ published statutory accounts. 
This includes staff costs, rolling stock costs, access charges, other operating expenditure and 
depreciation and amortisation. I corporating more recent years’ accounts, we were able to collect cost 
data for the franchised intercity and OAO operators for the financial years 2008 to 2017 or 2018. 
Along with the addition of more recent cost data, a small number of changes have been made affecting 
the cost data originally used in Wheat et al. (2018). First, we have exclud d some exceptional costs 
affecting certain TOCs in some years. These include, for example, restructuring osts at the start of a 
franchise.  Second, a small number of changes were made to the way that TOC costs in the accounts 
are allocated to financial years – specifically, in the case of East Coast, where the update to the data set 
revealed some clear allocation issues between the final financial years in the previous database. Third, 
we have corrected a small number of entries to include certain administrative costs that were originally 
excluded. This is due to differences in the reporting of various costs, not only between TOCs but also 
sometimes from one year to the next for the same TOC – for example, some accounts report ‘operating 
costs’ while others separate this out into ‘cost of sales’ and ‘administrative costs’. Where the latter 
                                                     
1 Henceforth, throughout this paper we refer to years as being the financial year ending the year referenced. Hence 
2012 refers to the year covering the period 1st April 2011 to 31st March 2012. 
2 Following Wheat et al. (2018), we exclude Great Western as, whilst this franchise operates a substantial intercity 
service, it also operates regional and London commuting services (roughly on a third split each).  
 
terminology has been used, cost of sales and administrative costs must be added togeth r t  ensure 
comparability with operating costs elsewhere. In a small number of cases, administrative costs had been 
erroneously excluded – this has now been corrected. 
Finally, we use revised data for the Retail Price Index (RPI) as our deflator. Despite these changes, t e 
new cost data conform closely to the data used by Wheat et al. (2018). 
OAO and franchised operators in Great Britain differ significantly in terms of their contributions to 
infrastructure costs. The franchised operators pay variable track access charges (VTAC ), which vary 
with usage, much larger additional fixed track access charges (FTACs) and several other charges to 
Network Rail, the infrastructure manager (IM). The OAO pay only VTACs, although it should be noted 
that franchises are in general compensated for any unexpected changes in FTACs in the franchis  period 
and so these are essentially a pass through to the ultimate funder, the government. How ver, the ORR 
explain that this difference reflects the fact that OAO have only marginal access to the network, and 
considers that a significant expansion of OAOs would necessitate some contribution over and above 
VTACs, in particular to reflect the impact of revenue abstraction on government support to the industry 
(Office of Rail and Road, 2001). 
To ensure comparability between the costs of the FIOs and OAOs, we subtract all access charges, with 
the exception of traction electricity charges, which are passed through from Network Rail to the TOCs, 
from total operating costs. Data on access charges for franchised operators are taken from Network 
Rail’s regulatory accounts. For OAOs, we were only able to obtain data for 2016 for Hull Trains and 
Grand Central. In both of these cases, the access charges were almost exactly the same on a per train 
km basis. For other years, we extrapolated the OAO access variable access charges based on this per 
train km value, adjusting for inflation. In addition, some ad-hoc adjustments were made to the raw cost 
data for East Coast (years 2008 to 2010 and 2018) and West Coast (2010 and 2011) to smooth out 
volatility in reported costs. 
In addition, as in Wheat et al. (2018) we make adjustments to the FIOs’ costs to reflect the additional 
costs associated with operating stations. The OAOs and one of the FIOs (Cross Country) d  not operate 
stations, whilst the remaining two FIOs, East Coast and West Coast, each operate stations, and therefore
some adjustment is needed to improve comparability with the OAOs. We apply a 2.6% reduction to 
East Coasts’ costs, and a 17.9% reduction to West Coast’s costs. These values are based on the 
reductions applied in Wheat et al. (2018), which in turn are based on the econometric model of Wh at 
and Smith (2015). 
Regarding energy costs, a mixture of electric and diesel traction is used by TOCs included in our 
analyses. Diesel costs are included in the accounting costs used to construct our unit cost measures. 
Traction electricity charges are accounted for in a different way, since Network Rail charge the TOCs 
 
for traction electricity on a cost pass through basis, and these charges are one of several track access 
charges. Therefore, when subtracting access charges, we left traction electricity charges in. This ensures 
that fuel costs are fully accounted for in our unit cost measures. 
Table 1: Data description and sources 
Variable Source Coverage 
Operating costs TOC Accounts 2008 to 2018 
Wage/Salary Staff costs / Employees 2008 to 2018 
‘Other’ price Other costs / Rolling stock numbers 2008 to 2018 
Staff costs TOC Accounts 2008 to 2018 
Employees TOC Accounts 2008 to 2018 
Other costs TOC Accounts 2008 to 2018 
Network Rail Access 
Charges (excluding traction 
electricity) 
Wheat and Smith (2015) and Wheat et 
al. (2018) datasets 
2008 to 2009 
Network Rail Regulatory Accounts 
2010 to 2018 
(Franchised TOCs only) 
UK Rail Industry Financial 
Information 2015-16 
2016 
(OAOs only) 
Train km 
Wheat and Smith (2015) and Wheat et 
al. (2018) datasets 
2008 to 2010 
NRT Data Portal, Table 12.13 2011 to 2018 
Passenger km 
Wheat and Smith (2015) and Wheat et 
al. (2018) datasets 
2008 to 2010 
(Franchised TOCs only) 
NRT Data Portal, Table 2.1 & Table 
12.11 
2011 to 2018 
Vehicle km 
Wheat and Smith (2015) and Wheat et 
al. (2018) datasets 
2008 to 2010 
Previous FOI Request 2012 & 2014 
Number of vehicles 
(rolling stock) 
Wheat and Smith (2015) and Wheat et 
al. (2018) datasets 
2008 to 2010 
PTIS Correspondence 2011 to 2015 
DfT Rolling Stock Perspective 
2016 to 2018 
(Franchised TOCs only) 
Various online sources 
2016 to 2018 
(OAOs only) 
Public Performance Measure ORR 2007 Q1 to 2019 Q1 
Percentage of trains cancelled 
and significantly late 
ORR 2007 Q1 to 2019 Q1 
Percentage of respondents 
satisfied or very satisfied 
overall with their journey 
Passenger Focus Survey Biannual, 2013 to 2018 
Percentage of respondents 
satisfied or very satisfied with 
punctuality/reliability 
Passenger Focus Survey Biannual, 2013 to 2018 
 
 
The data are summarised in Table 2, which shows the means and standard deviations of each unit cost 
and input price variable for the OAOs and FIOs. From this, we can see that the pictur regarding unit 
costs of OAOs vs. those of FIOs changes depending upon the denominator used: per train kilometre, 
the mean unit cost is lower for OAOs than for FIOs, however, mean unit costs are lower for FIOs on a 
per passenger km or per vehicle km basis. In terms of input prices, mean staff costs per employee are 
slightly lower among FIOs, while OAO non-staff costs per vehicle are lower than those of FIOs on 
average. 
Table 2: Summary of open access and franchised intercity data (£, 2018 prices) 
Variable Open access operators (OAOs) Franchised intercity operators (FIOs) 
 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Cost per train km 15.838 2.528 18.925 4.444 
Cost per train km 
(after stations 
adjustment) 
15.838 2.528 17.464 4.077 
Cost per passenger km 0.124 0.026 0.113 0.023 
Cost per passenger km 
(after stations 
adjustment) 
0.124 0.026 0.105 0.024 
Cost per vehicle km 2.986 0.560 2.730 0.723 
Cost per vehicle km 
(after stations 
adjustment) 
2.986 0.560 2.563 0.809 
Staff costs per employee 56,593 8,759 54,108 3,539 
Non-staff costs per 
vehicle 
725,023 191,302 954,702 259,414 
Non-staff costs per 
vehicle 
(after stations 
adjustment) 
725,023 191,302 875,352 203,811 
 
3.3. Statistical Testing 
In subsequent sections, we discuss these comparisons in more detail, tracking changes in averages over 
time and the statistical significance (or otherwise) of the apparent differences between OAOs and FIOs. 
In the next section, we outline the methods used in our comparisons and statistical testing of OAO and 
FIO data. 
In Section 4, we compare OAOs and FIOs in terms of unit cost, factor prices and service quality metrics. 
First, we undertake a statistical analysis comparing the distributions of these metrics, wi h OAOs on the 
one hand and FIOs on the other. Second, we compare the OAO and FIO averages for these metrics and 
 
discuss their trends over time. We focus discussion on the comparison of OAO and FIO unit costs and 
how these may be explained with reference to observed differences in factor prices, service quality and 
in the context of findings in the previous literature. 
We follow the approach taken by Wheat et al. (2018), in using the Wilcoxon (1945) rank-sum test, also 
known as the Mann-Whitney U test (Mann and Whitney, 1947). This is used to determine wheth r or 
not two samples differ significantly from one another, and is a non-parametric alternative to the 
Student’s t test, and avoids the assumptions the latter makes regarding the distribution of the means of 
the samples. The samples we are comparing are observations relating to OAOs on the one hand and 
observations relating to FIOs on the other. The specific null hypothesis being tested is that the medians 
of the two distributions are the same. 
Given two samples, the first containing 軽怠 observations and the second containing 軽態 observations, the 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test statistic is calculated by combining the two samples together, ranking each of 
the observations, and summing the ranks of the observations from the first sample, such that: 
 激 噺 布 迎怠沈朝迭沈退怠  (1)  
It can be shown that the mean and variance of this statistic are given by: 
 継岫激岻 噺 軽怠岫軽怠 髪 軽態 髪 な岻に  (2)  
 Var岫激岻 噺 軽怠軽態岫軽怠 髪 軽態岻岫軽怠 髪 軽態 伐 な岻 崛布 布盤迎珍沈 伐 迎博匪態朝迭沈退怠態珍退怠 崑 (3) 
Where 迎博 is the mean rank. We calculate a p-value based on the standard normal approximation: 
 権 噺 激 伐 継岫激岻紐Var岫激岻  (4)  
Note that here we are testing for systematic differences in the rankings of ob ervations from the two 
samples, rather than differences in the means of the two samples or similar. This method is therefore 
not particularly sensitive to outlying observations within a given sample. Car should therefore be taken 
be taken when interpreting the output of these tests. In particular, they differ in interpretation from the 
graphs shown, which show trends in means between the two groups. 
4. Results 
In this section, we compare trends in each of our unit cost, input price, and qu lity of service variables 
for OAOs and FIOs. Following discussion of these trends, we present results from Wilcoxon and 
clustered Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, as discussed in the previous section, comparing the distributions of 
 
these variables between OAOs and FIOs. In this present study, we have substantially more data on both 
OAOs and FIOs than was available for Wheat et al. (2018), including recent years. It is therefore 
possible to look at the changes over the whole eleven-year period from 2008 to 2018. 
4.1. Unit costs 
Figure 1 compares trends in costs per train km. From this, we can see that costs per km were initially 
lower for OAOs than FIOs – this is consistent with the earlier findings of Wheat et al. (2018), which 
indicated lower cost per train hour from 2007-08 to 2011-12 for OAOs. However, since then there 
appears to have been a convergence between OAO and FIO costs per train km, though with the former 
remaining slightly lower. Excluding Wrexham and Shropshire, which ceased operations in 2011 
increases the OAO average unit costs somewhat in the early years. 
 
Figure 1: Comparison of OAO and FIO costs per train km, 2008 to 2018 
 
Figure 2 compares the trends in OAO and FIO costs per passenger km. From this, we see that, although 
OAO costs per passenger km are initially (from 2011, when OAO passenger km data becomes available) 
almost double FIO costs per passenger km, the former converges over the sample period to be 
essentially the same. This catching up is driven by a dramatic increase in OAO passenger km, from 
332.8 million in 2010-11 to 642.8 million in 2016-17, during a period in which train km remained 
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steady. Additionally, there seems to have been a notable reduction in costs among both groups over the 
period.   
Figure 3 shows the trends in OAO and FIO costs per vehicle km. Here, we can see that costs per vehicle 
km have generally been higher for OAOs than for FIOs. Again, this contrasts with the lower per train 
km costs for OAOs seen in Figure 1, which reflects the smaller trains – in terms of vehicles per train – 
and lower passenger loadings among OAOs. There is also a notable decrease in costs per vehicle km 
for both OAOs and FIOs of roughly £1 (in 2018 prices) from 2008 to 2014. 
 
Figure 2: Comparison of OAO and FIO costs per passenger km, 2008 to 2018 
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Figure 3: Comparison of OAO and FIO costs per vehicle km, 2008 to 2014 
 
Following the discussion of trends in unit costs above, we now move on to discuss the statistical 
significance of the differences in these measures between OAOs and FIOs.  
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Table 3 below shows the results of our statistical tests regarding the distributions of OAO and FIO unit 
costs. When looking at the Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, a positive 権 statistic indicates that a given metric 
tends to be higher among FIOs, while a negative 権 statistic indicates that values tend to be higher among 
OAOs.  
  
 
Table 3: Wilcoxon rank-sum tests comparing FIO and OAO unit costs (2018 prices) 
Measure Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
 z-score p-value 
Cost per train km 2.5350 0.0112 
  ** 
2008 to 2012 1.9030 0.0570 
  * 
2013 to 2018 1.7573 0.0789 
  * 
Cost per train km 
(after stations adjustment) 
1.9189 0.0550 
  * 
2008 to 2012 1.2199 0.2225 
   
2013 to 2018 1.7071 0.0878 
  * 
Cost per passenger km -1.3523 0.1763 
   
2008 to 2012 -2.0732 0.0382 
  ** 
2013 to 2018 -1.4561 0.1454 
   
Cost per passenger km 
(after stations adjustment) 
-2.6544 0.0079 
  *** 
2008 to 2012 -2.0732 0.0382 
  ** 
2013 to 2018 -2.7113 0.0067 
  *** 
Cost per vehicle km -1.3093 0.1904 
   
2008 to 2012 -0.9238 0.3556 
   
2013 to 2018 -1.1547 0.2482 
   
Cost per vehicle km 
(after stations adjustment) 
-1.9203 0.0548 
  * 
2008 to 2012 -1.4434 0.1489 
   
2013 to 2018 -1.1547 0.2482 
   
*Significant at the 10% level **Significant at the 5% level ***Significant at the 1% level 
Results are shown for each unit cost metric, firstly for the period as a whole, and secondly for two sub-
periods – 2008 to 2012 and 2013 to 2018. These periods were chosen for two reasons: first, the former 
period corresponds roughly to that studied by Wheat et al. (2018). Second, for the per train km variables 
and later for our input price variables, this happened to result in an equal number of o servations in 
each sub-period. Third, 2013 was the first full year of where all OAOs were owned by large operating 
groups. Thus from an industry structure perspective this break point is important. 
 
We can see that, on a per train km basis, FIOs appear to be more costly, while on a p r vehicle km or 
per passenger km basis, FIOs appear to be less costly. Looking at the per train km comparisons, 
according to the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, the difference between OAOs and FIOs seems to be 
significant at the 10% level across the period as a whole and in the second sub-period, when the stations 
adjustment is made. When station costs are not adjusted for, the result appears significant at the 10% 
level for both sub-periods, and at the 5% level for the period as a whole.  
Similarly, when adjusting for stations costs, FIO costs per passenger km appear to be significantly lower 
than those of OAOs – at the 5% level in the first sub-period and at the 1% level for the second sub-
period and for the period as a whole – according to the test.  
For the cost per vehicle km variables, the differences between OAO and FIO costs per vehicl  km do 
not appear to be statistically significant in general, with the exception of a significant difference across 
the period as a whole when we adjust for station costs. This indicates th  there is weak evidence that 
OAOs are slightly more expensive than FIOs on a per vehicle km basis. This finding is different to that 
in Wheat et al. (2018). The difference between this result and the cost per train km is explained by the 
fact that OAO operate shorter trains (typically 5 cars) than FIO (typically 9 cars).  
To summarize, across all three unit costs measures, we find some differences that appear to be 
significant according to the Wilcoxon rank-sum test and these complement the previous discus ions 
comparing summary statistics and trends over time. As found in Wheat et al. (2018),even with a more 
mature market, there is still evidence that, per train-km (train hour in Wheat et al. (2018)),  OAOs are 
cheaper but now we find weak evidence that, per vehicle km, OAOs are more expensive than FIOs.   
This is an important result, since as Wheat et al. (2018) noted, our a priori expectation would be that 
OAOs should be significantly more expensive in terms of unit costs, since they are much smaller than 
their FIO counterparts and therefore unable to exploit the economies of scale and density suggested by 
the wider literature on TOC costs – for example, Wheat and Smith (2015) find that intercity TOCs in 
Great Britain are subject to increasing returns to density. OAOs operate shorter trains, so the finding 
being only applicable to vehicle-km and not train-km should not be surprising.  
However, the difference is hardly as dramatic as the 30+% “open access business model effect” found 
in Wheat et al (2018). If we had re-evaluated the cost model used in Wheat et al. (2018) with this 
updated data, we would still expect a similar result as the business model effect aros  since the cost 
model predicted substantial economies of scale (density) for OAO operators, implying they are too 
small in size and so would be predicted, all other things being equal, to have high costs.  
As such, it is reasonable to think there may be other factors helping to lower OAO costs to offset these 
scale disadvantages and bring OAO unit costs into line with FIO costs. This motivates a comparison of 
 
two obvious candidates – input prices and service quality – that may differ between OAOs and FIOs. If 
OAOs face cheaper input prices, or offer lower quality service, or both, this would reduce their unit 
costs. 
4.2. Input prices 
Figure 4 and Figure 5 below show the trends in OAO and FIO staff costs per employee and non-staff 
costs per vehicle, respectively. The picture regarding staff costs per employee depends upon whether 
or not we weight to account for the differences in TOC size in each group. We show total staff costs for 
all OAOs (FIOs) divided by total number of employees for all OAOs (FIOs). On the other hand, using 
simple unweighted means of staff costs per employee, we find that the FIO mean is lower than that for 
the OAOs, as shown in Table 2. 
Looking at Figure 5, we see that non-staff costs per vehicle seem to have been lower for OAOs than 
FIOs, particularly for most of the first half of the sample period, with the difference being smaller in 
later years. Excluding Wrexham and Shropshire has a negligible impact on the comparison between 
FIOs and OAOs here. 
 
Figure 4: Comparison of OAO and FIO staff costs per employee, 2008 to 2018 
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Figure 5: Comparison of OAO and FIO non-staff costs per vehicle, 2008 to 2018 
 
As with unit costs, we now proceed to discuss the statistical significance (or otherwise) of the 
differences in input prices between OAOs and FIOs. Table 4 shows the results of difference in means 
and Wilcoxon rank-sum comparing input prices among OAOs and FIOs. 
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Table 4: Wilcoxon rank-sum tests comparing FIO and OAO input prices (2017-18 prices) 
Measure Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
 z-score p-value 
Staff costs per employee -0.6514 0.5148 
   
2008 to 2012 -0.4880 0.6256 
   
2013 to 2018 -0.9038 0.3661 
   
Non-staff costs per 
vehicle 
3.1160 0.0018 
  *** 
2008 to 2012 2.8301 0.0047 
  *** 
2013 to 2018 1.3055 0.1917 
   
Non-staff costs per 
vehicle 
(after stations 
adjustment) 
2.5526 0.0107 
  ** 
2008 to 2012 2.2446 0.0248 
  ** 
2013 to 2018 1.2552 0.2094 
   
*Significant at the 10% level **Significant at the 5% level ***Significant at the 1% level 
 
On staff costs per employee, Table 4 leads us to a simple conclusion; in none of the tests, either for the 
period as a whole, or for either of the sub-periods, the differences do not appear to be statistically 
significant. We therefore conclude that staff costs per employee are comparable for OAOs and FIOs. 
On non-staff costs, the Wilcoxon rank-sum test suggests that non-staff costs per vehicl ar  significantly 
higher for FIOs than for OAOs, both for the period as a whole and for the first sub-period (though not 
the second). When adjusting for stations costs, these results are significant at the 5% level, whilst 
without this adjustment, the differences are significant at the 1% level.  
To summarise, results on input prices, comparisons of means and trends suggest lower taff costs per 
employee and non-staff costs per vehicle, for OAOs compared to FIOs. However, with respect to taff, 
these differences do not appear to be statistically significant which they are for other costs. 
4.3. Service quality  
Another important dimension of performance is service quality. Two service quality indicators used in 
Britain are the Public Performance Measure (PPM), which is a measure of the percentag of tr ins 
 
arriving at their final destination on time3 and the percentage of trains cancelled or significantly late 
(CaSL). Comparable data for both measures are available on a quarterly basis from 2007. Table 5 
compares PPM and CaSL between OAOs and FIOs. 
Figure 6 and Figure 7 below compare trends in PPM and CaSL indices, respectively. Since these 
indicators are more comparable between service types, we include a series for all franchised TOCs in 
addition to these for OAOs and FIOs. In each case, we construct a weighted average for each group, 
where the scores are weighted by number of trains planned by each respective TOC. We use three-
quarter moving averages to smooth out the significant seasonal volatility in the raw data4. 
In terms of both PPM and CaSL, we see that OAOs perform significantly worse than FIOs, and that 
FIOs in turn perform worse than franchised operators in general. It is in eresting that, in the early 
quarters of the sample period, OAOs performed slightly better than FIOs and franchised TOCs more 
widely, before declining. There is also a period of improvement among OAOs between 2014 and 2016; 
following this, however, the OAOs’ performance again deteriorates and is significantly worse than that 
of the FIOs. We can also see a general decline in service quality across all TOCs towards the end of the 
sample period. 
                                                     
3 Defined as up to 5 minutes after the scheduled arrival time for short distance journ ys, and up to 10 minutes 
after the scheduled arrival time for long distance journeys. 
4 Note that the original, unsmoothed data were used for the tests presented in Table 4, how ver. 
 
 
Figure 6: Comparison of OAO and FIO PPM, 2007 Q2 to 2018 Q4 (moving average) 
 
Figure 7: Comparison of OAO and FIO CaSL, 2007 Q2 to 2018 Q4 (moving average) 
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Table 5 below examines the statistical significance of the differences in PPM and CaSL between OAOs 
and FIOs, according to the Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. 
Table 5: Wilcoxon rank-sum tests comparing FIO and OAO service quality (2007 Q1 to 2019 Q1) 
Measure Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
 z-score p-value 
Public Performance 
Measure 
5.3083 0.0000 
  *** 
Percentage Cancelled and 
Significantly Late 
-6.1445 0.0000 
  *** 
*Significant at the 10% level **Significant at the 5% level ***Significant at the 1% level 
 
From the above, we can see that PPM was significantly higher and CaSL significantly lower, among 
FIOs compared to OAOs. According to the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, these differences are significant at 
the 1% level. Therefore, we conclude that, according to both measures, OAOs offer significantly lower 
service quality in terms of punctuality, cancellations and significant lateness. 
4.4. Passenger satisfaction 
However we do note that OAOs consistently score highly on public satisfaction. For exampl , in the 
August 2018 satisfaction survey (Transport Focus, 2019), Grand Central and Hull Trains scored 94% 
and 91% respectively for percentage of respondents who agreed that they were satisfied wi h their 
journey (page 11). This compares to 87%, 90% and 81% for the FIOs East Coast, West Coast and Cross 
Country respectively. Even when examining results for satisfaction with punctuality and reliability 
(page 13), Grand Central and Hull Trains scored 91% and 84% respectively, compared to the FIOs with 
79%, 84%, 76% for East Coast, West Coast and Cross Country respectively. Thus, even though OAO 
do have measurable lower performance than FIOs, it seems there is no evidence that the rail users 
perceive this as problematic. 
Below, we compare the overall satisfaction levels of OAO and FIO passengers according to the 
Transport Focus survey. Specifically, we compare the results for two questions: first, on ‘overall 
satisfaction with the journey’, and second on ‘satisfaction with punctuality/reliability’. The survey is 
undertaken biannually, in spring and autumn each year. Historical data are available, broken down by 
TOC, back to Autumn 2013. Possible responses are very satisfied, satisfied, neither satisfied nor 
unsatisfied, unsatisfied, and very unsatisfied. We combine the results for OAOs by adding together the 
number of respondents for OAOs who responded that they were either very satisfied or atisfied, and 
express these as  percentages of respondents for OAOs. We then do the same for FIOs. 
 
 
Figure 8: Comparison of OAO and FIO overall satisfaction with journey, 2013 to 2018 
 
 
Figure 9: Comparison of OAO and FIO satisfaction with punctuality/reliability, 2013 to 2018 
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From Figure 8, we can see that, consistent with the preceding discussion, OAOs have tended to have 
higher passenger satisfaction with the journey overall. In light of the significantly worse performance 
of OAOs on punctuality and reliability measures seen in the previous section, this seem  puzzling, but 
perhaps reflects other aspects of service quality, e.g. comfort. It is also possible that this higher 
satisfaction for OAOs is being driven primarily by lower fares. 
Unexpectedly, however, this OAO advantage in passenger satisfaction persists even when passengers 
are asked specifically about punctuality and reliability, as shown in Figure 9. This is of course much 
harder to reconcile with OAOs’ poorer performance on measures such as CaSL and PPM. We can think 
of two factors that potentially explain this result. First, it may be that when asked how satisfied they are 
with punctuality and reliability, their response may depend on the fare they paid, i.e. pass ngers paying 
more may expect higher standards, while passengers paying less may have lower expectations which 
are easier to meet. Second, it may be that OAOs’ target a different market with different needs and 
expectations which are easier to meet. 
Table 5 below shows, for both questions, Wilcoxon rank sum tests comparing the distributions of 
percentages of respondents saying they were satisfied or very satisfied. Her, individual TOC results 
are used. 
Table 6: Wilcoxon rank-sum tests comparing FIO and OAO passengers’ satisfaction (biannual, 
autumn 2013 to autumn 2018) 
Measure Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
 z-score p-value 
Percentage satisfied or 
very satisfied overall with 
journey 
-4.8105 0.0000 
  *** 
Percentage unsatisfied or 
very unsatisfied with 
punctuality/reliability 
-3.4704 0.0005 
  *** 
*Significant at the 10% level **Significant at the 5% level ***Significant at the 1% level 
These results suggest that the difference between the distributions for OAOs and FIOs are significantly 
different at the 1% level. Again for the latter question, this is in direct contrast to the significantly worse 
CaSL and PPM scores for OAOs seen in the previous section. This suggests that caution should be used 
in interpreting the results of satisfaction surveys, as these may say more about a TOC’s passengers than 
about underlying differences in service quality. 
5. Summary and conclusions 
In this paper, we have contributed to the evidence, both in Britain and Europe more widely, regarding 
the merits of open access competition in passenger rail services. This issue is of increasing relevance 
 
given the emergence of open access operators (OAOs) in recent years and the expansion of open access 
operation envisioned under the EU’s fourth railway package. Using an extended dataset on British 
OAOs and comparable franchised intercity operators (FIOs) covering 2008 to 2018 (financial year end 
date), we have updated the analysis of Wheat et al. (2018) comparing OAO and FIO unit costs and input 
prices. In addition, we have for the first time included a comparison of service quality metrics capturing 
punctuality, lateness and cancellations, and also of passenger satisfaction survey results. 
A re-analysis of the data for Britain is timely as Britain has readily vailable route level data on the 
incumbent (franchised operator), which is often lacking in other countries as it is only available at the 
network wide level. We have extend the time period considerably over the previous Wheat et al. (2018) 
study, doubling the amount of years we have available for comparison. This also now includes the 
period where OAO in Britain has matured particularly as from 2012 all OAO are owned by relatively 
large groups.  
We find that, with respect to unit costs, per train km costs were lower among OAOs, while costs per 
passenger km and costs per vehicle km were higher among OAOs. This reflect  the lower number of 
vehicles per train and lower passenger loadings among OAOs during the period. OAO costs per 
passenger fell significantly from 2011 to 2017, reflecting a dramatic increase in passenger km. 
However, we find that the differences in unit costs are not always statistically significant. The 
conclusion that unit costs are broadly comparable between OAOs and FIOs complements that of Whe t 
et al. (2018), and is again contrary to the expectation that the small OAOsfound in Britain should have 
higher unit costs due to their inability to fully exploit economies of scale and density. 
Comparing input prices, we find no significant differences between OAOs in terms of staff costs per 
employee. OAOs had lower non-staff costs per vehicle than their FIO counterparts, with he differences 
weakly significant (i.e. at the 10% level) in the first half of the sample period but otherwise insignificant. 
We therefore conclude that input prices, like unit costs, were comparable between OAOs and FIOs, 
suggesting that input price differences alone are not able to explain the comparability of OAO and FIO 
unit costs. 
We compared two measures of service quality: the public performance measure (PPM), which measures 
punctuality, and the percentage of trains cancelled or significantly late (CaSL). In this case, we did find 
statistically significant differences. According to both measures, OAOs perform significantly worse 
than their FIO counterparts. Thus, one potential explanation for the unexpected finding of comparable 
OAO and FIO unit costs is that OAOs run low-cost, low-quality services, which complements a 
previous observation by Perennes (2017) on OAOs in Europe. 
An alternative interpretation could be that FIOs have a greater ability to minimise delays, and that 
OAOs’ lower pricing is an unwanted consequence of this, however in Great Britain the timetable is 
 
administered through a process with independent oversight. This independent timetabling process does 
not offer the franchisees much flexibility, and in fact the argument usually made is that OAOs have 
greater flexibility given their ability to ‘cherry-pick’ the best services and slots. One key factor behind 
OAOs’ poorer punctuality and reliability results is a lack of trains, and OAOs’ trains breaking down. 
In light of OAOs’ poorer performance on punctuality and reliability, we also have the puzzling finding 
that OAOs have higher passenger satisfaction scores than the FIOs, even when passengers are askd 
specifically about punctuality and reliability, and that this difference is statistically significant. We 
conjecture that this may be more reflective of the different markets served by OAOs, and the lower 
fares offered, which may lead to lower expectations regarding service quality. 
A limitation of our study is that, in comparing partial metrics such as unit costs, service quality measures 
and input price data, we gain only a partial understanding of OAO costs and performance. A clear 
avenue for future research would be to take a comprehensive approach to the modelling of OAO costs 
and performance through the estimation of an econometric model including data on both OAO and 
franchised operators.  
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